I too was left breathless by Will Wilkinsonâs wrenchingly beautiful post last weekend on religion, meaning and memory. Read it if you havenât. Iâve nothing directly to add, except that it caused me to get off the metro at the wrong stop yesterday remembering its passion and eloquence.
My snarky side recovered just a bit, though, upon reading the comments, wherein a fellow blogger averred that âan intellectual is one who would rather be right than happy.â
Those who know me would suggest that for me this is a false choice, since few things make me more blissfully happy than being right, but the assertion raises deeper questions. Can we choose our beliefs, such that itâs possible to elect the state of being ârightâ over the state of being âhappyâ and vice versa? And, if so, does âhappyâ mean something so narrow that one might âratherâ be something else?
In the past Iâve taken the position that beliefs canât be chosen â that a belief is analogous to the result of an algebraic equation. These inputs, you get that result. Anyone who claims to disbelieve their result is probably just pretending, for to disbelieve the result one would have to disbelieve the inputs (and thus the validity of oneâs senses) or the reasoning process itself. Of course perceptions and lines of reasoning are sometimes flawed. But to lack confidence in either of these as a general matter would leave one completely helpless to act. Simply put, weâd have nothing to believe.
But I came to understand rather late in life that many people do not perceive reasoning as their best way of apprehending truth. Instead, they rely to a much greater extent on those inarticulate emotional responses to our environment that we call intuition. But though intuition can generate very general normative results like âheâs a wonderful guy,â it canât possibly generate specific answers to complex factual questions like âHow was the universe created? or âWhat do I need to know to pass Statistics?â I can understand having a âhunch for Godâ in the sense that one may have a strong intuition that the world has objective meaning or normative value of some sort. I vaguely remember a guy named Wittgenstein saying something persuasively like that. But how, other than reason, do people arrive at the details of their beliefs?
The group of people referred to in the aphorism above as âintellectualsâ share a certain psychological bias: they tend to form their important beliefs based mostly on their own reasoning processes. They welcome additional information or a thorough critique of their process, but donât generally accept as true the end result of someone elseâs process, unless it is a relatively unimportant belief that itâs not efficient to double-check, or unless it rests on so much specialized information that it wouldnât be efficient to learn it.
The dominant bias, by contrast, may well be to use oneâs intuition to choose a person who appears well equipped in one way or another to do the detail-level reasoning for the whole group. The part of this scenario that may be counterintuitive to some so-called âintellectualsâ is that this probably a perfectly rational behavior for many people. If oneâs gift is great intuition, why not?
Itâs the criteria on which the intuitive selection of an opinion leader is often based, I think, that may cause any slippage between reason and belief. To start with, letâs assume that a person selecting an opinion leader wishes to select one from the pool of folks he believes have better reasoning processes than he does. This may not be universally true, but if oneâs gift is intuition, and one feels a need to select an opinion leader to fill in details that intuition is poorly suited to providing, then it would make sense.
Now, if one is selecting an opinion leader from a pool of folks whose reasoning processes are superior to oneâs own, one might need to look to secondary evidence of the quality of the candidatesâ processes, since one is presumably ill-placed to evaluate those processes directly. Persuasive impressions might include popularity, happiness of existing followers, financial success, apparent sincerity and passion for truth.
Is choosing an opinion leader â whether a minister, a teacher, a lawyer or a motivational speaker â with happy followers the same as choosing happiness over ârightnessâ? Not necessarily, since choosing an opinion leader based on secondary characteristics such as happiness might be the most rational way for a given person to pursue detailed correct beliefs. After all, all forms of this pursuit are imperfect, including ours.
So, I think the answer to the question âCan one choose oneâs beliefs?â - or more specifically âCan one choose to be happy rather than right?â - is âNo, not directly.â Most everyone is pursuing a rational strategy for finding truth, although approaches may differ. Weâre just stuck with wrestling rightness to the ground directly because weâve personally found that itâs our best survival strategy.
Note: Iâve posted this knowing full well that Iâll be begging for mercy very shortly, and probably drowning in Radleyâs pool with the little fishies, or whatever. I ask only one small mercy from potential respondents. Please avoid jargon! I havenât the educational background for it.
Posted by Marie Gryphon on January 17, 2003As a psychological matter, you're right that most people don't just straightforwardly go out and say: "It'd make me happy to think that X, and therefore, I'll believe it!" But there's an old saying I like: "a 'conclusion' is the point at which you got tired of thinking." That is, I may have a belief set which I don't particularly prod very much, or scrutinize for inconsistencies, when I would do so if what I cared about most was having true beliefs. Simliarly, I think we often find it the case that we'll hear a challenge to some cherished belief -- a counterargument -- and we'll just decide we don't want to think about it. It's not worth it, either because the disutility of thinking is greater than the benefit of being right, or because what we're really afraid of, at some level, is that we'll be convinced we're wrong. I read a psychologist report once on attending an intro-to-Transcendental Mediation workshop with a logician friend. During the question period, the logician stands up and SHREDS everything that's been said by the presenters. To everyone's surprise, an unusually large number of people then rush to sign up for the course. They asked why later. What the people basically said was: "I was hoping that TM would be able to solve problem X for me. And after hearing those arguments, if I'd gone home and thought it over, I'd probably have decided not to sign up, that it was no good. But I don't know what other solutions there are! So I wanted to commit to this one before I acknowledged that it wasn't any good..." Yep, really. We're in the minority here Gryph.
Posted by: Julian on January 17, 2003 5:04 PMI enjoyed both the original post and the comments by Julian on the psychological development of personal beliefs. This needs to be expanded by considering the aggregation of one's private beliefs into more public "belief systems" which are supported by hierarchies of leaders and followers. Religious movements and polical parties are good examples, but so are seemingly mundane groups like industry trade associations.
The organization of beliefs into powerful systems is needed to accomplish goals and objectives in real life. This is true whether you are lobbying for steel tarifs or working the streets of New Delhi as a Mormon missionary.
Leaders arise and followers join not only because they may share a psychological or philosphical path but also because they derive strongly valued benefits by identifying themselves as believers. It may be "going to heaven" or even something more tangible.
Posted by: John on January 18, 2003 12:43 AMThis subject has inspired me to finally start posting to my blog. I think the main thing to keep in mind is that matters of religion and philosophy are only a small part of one's overall set of knowledge/beliefs/"truths." Some people examine their own feelings very carefully, but don't care to question whether Moses actually saw a burning bush. Truth can be very useful in some ways, and not so much in others.
Posted by: Anthony on January 19, 2003 9:24 PM